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INTRODUCTION 
Petitioner Lorin Blauer submits the following reply brief in connection with his 
Petition for Review of decisions entered by the Utah Career Service Review Board 
("CSRB") herein, and in response to the "Answer Brief submitted on behalf of Utah 
Department of Workforce Services ("D WS") and CSRB ON June 9, 2011. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: CSRB IMPROPERLY DECLINED JURISDICTION OVER 
PETITIONER'S CLAIMS OF WORKPLACE 
DISCRIMINATION, AND DID NOT FIND IN FAVOR OF 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES IN 
CONNECTION THEREWITH. 
In response to CSRB's refusal - for the third time, in the face of three separate 
mandates from the judiciary - to hear Petitioner Lorin Blauer's grievance concerning 
workplace discrimination on jurisdictional grounds, Respondents argue that (1) CSRB 
actually did not decline jurisdiction at all, but denied Petitioner's discrimination claims 
on their merits, Petitioner having failed to present substantial evidence in support thereof; 
(2) Utah law afforded Petitioner no "private right of action" to grieve DWS' violation of 
workplace rules governing discrimination and harassment; and (3) despite prior rulings 
by the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, this Court and 
the and the Utah Supreme Court to the contrary, CSRB properly declined jurisdiction to 
hear Petitioner's claims of workplace rules violations relating to discrimination. The first 
and third of these were dealt with in Petitioner's opening brief, and will be revisited only 
briefly here; the second is raised for the first time, in the eight-year history of this dispute, 
by Respondents' Answering Brief, and is utterly without merit. 
QR1AOS 1 
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I 
A. CSRB Did Not Pass on the Merits of Petitioner's Discrimination Claim. 
At page 7, paragraph 7 of his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision and 
Order (R. 1566-1576; Petitioner's opening brief at Appendix Attachments), CSRB 
Hearing Officer James H. Beadles stated the following: 
Perhaps the heart of Mr. Blauer's claims is that DWS violated personnel 
rules relating to Utah Admin. Code R. 477-15 on spells out the state's 
general prohibition and workplace harassment. The evidence shows that 
DWS denied Mr, Blauer's request for an accommodation due to an alleged 
disability. Mr. Blauer did not appeal this decision to any higher level. 
However, even though the hulk of Mr. Blauer's evidence and comments 
relate to this issue, the CSRB is without jurisdiction to hear it. 
(Emphasis added.)1 The remainder of Hearing Officer Beadles5 analysis concerning 
Petitioner's discrimination claim has nothing to do with whether he presented substantial 
1
 The hearing officer's observation that Mr. Blauer "did not appeal this decision to 
any higher level" is vague and confusing, as Mr. Beadles does not identify the "decision" 
to which he refers, nor does he link it to any evidence of discrimination presented at the 
hearing. It is true that, in the summer of 2003, Mr. Blauer (at the recommendation of his 
superior) made an application for workplace accommodation to DWS' ADA officer, 
Chuck Butler, relative to his then-existing working conditions; also, that Mr. Blauer did 
not appeal from Mr. Butler's September 5, 2003 letter decision (Agency Exh. 6), which 
nominally found that Mr. Blauer did not qualify for ADA accommodation but 
recommended it anyway - there being thus no reason to pursue an appeal. Four days 
thereafter, though, Mr. Blauer received Tani Downing's September 9, 2003 
"reassignment" to full-time adjudicative duties which Mr. Blauer could not fulfill due to 
disability. It was to this renewed and expanded act of discrimination, occurring after 
Mr. Butler's September 5 letter, and to its impact on his ability to continue as a DWS 
employee, that "the bulk of Mr. Blauer's evidence and comments" related. See 
Petitioner's Brief at Statement of Facts ffi[ 12, 15, 17-21, 25-28, 31-39, and citations to 
the record therein. 
The hearing officer's observation, in fact, seems to mirror DWS' suggestion, 
elsewhere in these proceedings, that by not appealing Mr. Butler's September 5, 2003 
letter nominally denying ADA accommodation, Mr. Blauer somehow waived his claim of 
discrimination arising from events which happened after September 5. In addition to 
being illogical, this argument disregards the separate claim, made elsewhere in these 
proceedings by DWS, that neither Mr. Blauer nor any other state employee in Utah has 
982405.1 
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evidence in support thereof or not. It discusses solely the legal arguments repeatedly 
asserted by DWS and CSRB before the Third District Court, this Court, and the Utah 
Supreme Court - all of which had previously rejected these arguments, and ordered 
CSRB to hear Petitioner's discrimination claims on their merits. 
In its Step Six Decision, Order and Final Agency Action (R. 1946-1977, 
Petitioner's opening brief at Appendix Attachment 4), CSRB expressly affirmed the 
hearing officer's legal analysis, citing to and quoting the foregoing language, and 
articulating its approval of the hearing officer's jurisdictional conclusion (see Decision, 
Order and Final Agency Action at pp. 25-27), again citing two arguments urged by DWS 
before the district court, this Court and the Supreme Court before being ordered, upon 
remand, to hear Petitioner's claims on their merits. In response to this last, CSRB's 
decision stated the following: 
Regarding hearing officer Beadles' jurisdictional determinations, the Board 
acknowledges that prior decisions of the CSRB regarding jurisdiction have 
been overturned with affirmative remands for the CSRB to hear appellant's 
personnel rule violation grievances on their merits. However, the CSRB's 
prior jurisdictional determinations were not related to Utah Code Ann. 
Section 35A-5-107(15) which provides that the Utah Anti-Discrimination 
Act is the u exclusive " remedy for discrimination claims. Instead, the 
CSRB's prior jurisdictional decisions were based substantively on 
administrative waiver and findings that appellant had not raised these issues 
prior to Step Five of the state's grievance and pre-appeal procedures . . . in 
essence, the jurisdictional deficiencies raised by Hearing Officer Beadles in 
his Step Five decision are different than those raised in prior CSRB 
any rights under ADA, that act having no application to Utah state employees - thus 
rendering Mr. Butler and his office non-entities, and any decision on his part (or any 
appeal therefrom) a non-event. Even the most glaring inconsistency seems no obstacle 
for DWS in this matter - it will adopt whatever position it must as expedient to the 
moment, so long as the cumulative effect is to avoid having its misconduct scrutinized on 
the merits. 
3 
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decisions. Importantly in Blauer v. Utah Department of Workforce 
Services, 2008 Utah App. 84 {Blauer III), the Court of Appeals limited its 
jurisdiction remand to CSRB by including the "CSRB erred by considering 
jurisdictional issues that have already been decided by the district court." 
(Decision, Order and Final Agency Action at p. 28). 
It is unfathomable, in light of the foregoing record, that CSRB and DWS now ask 
this Court to conclude that, in fact, its mandate was somehow followed, and Petitioner 
was afforded a final decision and determination of his discrimination claims on their 
merits through a sustainable finding that he had failed to produce substantial evidence in 
support thereof. The hearing officer made no such determination. His only reference to 
the merits of Petitioner's claims plainly acknowledges that Petitioner was subjected to 
discrimination - R. 1566-1576 at p. 7, f^ 7; Petitioner's opening brief at Appendix 
Attachment 3. The suggestion that CSRB, at one and the same time, declined jurisdiction 
of Petitioner's discrimination grievance (for the third time), and yet somehow passed on 
the merits thereof, is not only logically inconsistent, but completely absurd. 
In its Step Six decision (Decision, Order and Final Agency Action, R. 1946-1977), 
CSRB does make the following observation: 
Based upon the facts elicited at the evidentiary hearing on this matter and 
our examination of the relevant personnel policy at issue in this claim, we 
find appellant failed to establish the department violated state personnel 
rules governing unlawful harassment, discrimination or retaliation. This 
determination is made under a correctness standard which allows the board 
to review the hearing officer's conclusions under a correctness standard and 
with little difference to legal determinations. 
No explanation is given for this statement. CSRB did not enter any findings of its own in 
support of its statement; it does not state that it is overruling the hearing officer's 
QR2405.1 
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determination that, in fact, Petitioner was the victim of discrimination.2 No explanation 
is offered as to what "conclusions" of the hearing officer are being reviewed de novo in 
connection therewith - the hearing officer's only legal conclusions concerning 
Mr. Blauer's discrimination claim was that he was somehow still without jurisdiction to 
pass on it. R. 1566-1576 at pp. 7-9. To the extent that, without explanation, CSRB was 
reversing the hearing officer's observation concerning discrimination against Petitioner 
and substituting its own judgment, CSRB offers no factual findings in support thereof. 
To the extent that CSRB, incident to Step Six of Petitioner's grievance, did make 
unspecified and unstated findings in that regard, they are clearly against the manifest 
weight of the evidence - as a matter of law (and for reasons set out at pp. 36-41 of 
Petitioner's opening brief), DWS' discriminatory conduct toward him was established not 
only by substantial evidence, but by overwhelming evidence presented to the hearing 
officer.3 
2
 Under Utah Admin. Code R. 137-1-22(4). CSRB was first to make a 
determination "whether the factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable 
and rational according to the substantial evidence standard.. .When the board determines 
that the factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are not reasonable and rational 
based on the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the board may, in its discretion, 
correct the factual findings, and/or make new or additional factual findings." No such 
determination was made in this instance. 
3
 At pp. 27-28 of their Answering Brief, Respondents raise the all-too-common cry 
that Petitioner has failed to marshal the evidence. The Court is referred, in this regard, to 
pp. 24-29 of Petitioner's opening brief. As more fully demonstrated in Petitioner's 
opening brief, none of his evidence succeeds in dislodging the substantial evidence 
presented before the hearing officer (and clearly accepted by him) that Petitioner was the 
victim of workplace discrimination by being deliberately reassigned to full time duties 
which medical disabilities precluded him from performing - and which would ultimately 
destroy his health. No marshalling of evidence can displace that fact. It is, in fact, 
oo/inc i 
5 
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4 
If CSRB's Step Six decision is viewed as a substitution of its own findings for 
those of its hearing officer, it is submitted that this court should afford that substitution no 
deference whatever; indeed, the reverse is true. The Court of Appeals, like any appellate 
tribunal, will defer to a lower tribunal on findings of fact due to the lower tribunal's 
opportunity to hear evidence, observe and evaluate the credibility of witnesses, etc. - see 
438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, 99 P.3d 801; Best v. Daimler Chrysler 
Corp., 2006 UT App.304, 141 P.3d 624. CSRB's Step Six review in this case, however, 
was not based on its own evidentiary hearing, but was limited to a review of the record 
before the hearing officer (Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-408 (2009); Utah Administrative 
Code at R. 137-1-22(4). It took no new evidence, and neither heard nor evaluated the 
credibility of any new witnesses - indeed, the scope of its review precluded such 
procedure (Id). CSRB, in effect, conducted a lower appellate review of the hearing 
officer's decision, the scope of which was limited to a determination of whether "the 
factual findings of CSRB's hearing officer are reasonable and rational according to the 
substantial evidence standard" - Utah Admin. Code R. 137-1-22(4) (a) While CSRB's 
Step Six decision made no finding that Mr. Beadle's decision failed this standard, this 
Court should at the very least review any implication of such finding de novo for 
correctness, and more appropriately construing facts most favorably to the determination 
of the actual trier of fact, who found substantial evidence of discrimination - precisely as, 
for example, the Utah Supreme Court would review such a decision of this Court on writ 
noteworthy that Respondents cite to no scrap of evidence presented before the hearing 
officer, but left out of Petitioner's brief, which would excuse DWS' conduct. 
982405.1 
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of certiorari -Archuleta v. Hughes, 969 P. 2d 409 (Utah 1998); England v. Horbach, 944 
P.2d340(Utahl997)4. 
To explore the evidentiary underpinnings of any hypothetical ruling on the merits 
of Petitioner's discrimination claim, however, is to ignore the realities of proceedings 
below. Once again, CSRB - at both the Step Five and Step Six stages - has abnegated 
jurisdiction over Petitioner's claims of violation, by DWS, of workplace rules regarding 
discrimination and harassment. In so doing, CSRB violated the mandate of this Court, 
and reversal is in order. 
B. Petitioner is Not Without a Private Right of Action to Address DWS' 
Violation of Workplace Rules Relating to Discrimination and Harassment 
Respondents devote four and one-half pages of their Answering Brief to an 
argument never before raised in any proceeding relating to this matter: Petitioner has no 
"private right of action" to address DWS5 violation of workplace rules relating to 
discrimination and harassment. The argument suffers two fundamental failings. 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-101, et seq. (2003) Affords Petitioner the 
Private Right of Action to Grieve Violation of Workplace Rules. 
Under Utah Code Annotated Section 67-19a-202(l)(a) (2003), the Utah Career 
Service Review Board was constituted for the purpose of "reviewing] appeals from 
Career Service employees and agencies of decisions about promotions, dismissals, 
demotions, suspensions, written reprimands, wages, salary, violations of personnel rules, 
4
 Petitioner is aware of the decision of Allen v. Department of Workforce Services, 
et aL, 2005 UT App.186, 112 P. 3d 1238, but submits that the dicta therein concerning 
the standard of review of an administrative appeals board's factual findings disregards the 
lack of any fundamental rationale or reason for deferential review, as suggested above. 
QR740S 1 
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issues concerning the equitable administration of benefits, reductions in force, and 
disputes concerning abandonment of position that have not been resolved at an earlier 
stage in the grievance procedure." That Petitioner Lorin Blauer was a "career service 
employee" has never been challenged.5 That he has timely pursued a grievance of DWS' 
violations of personnel rules relating to discrimination and harassment through all six 
levels of the grievance and appeals procedure specified at Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-301, 
etseq. (2003) is likewise undisputed. Upon CSRB's disposition of his Level Six 
grievance, Petitioner filed his petition with this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-
4-103(2) (a). 
DWS has participated, and defended itself, in this process every step of the way. 
Its suddenly-emerging claim that, after all administrative remedies have been exhausted, 
Petitioner never had a "private right of action" for DWS5 violation of personnel policies 
and workplace rules at all, borders on the frivolous. 
2. Respondents' "No Private Right of Action" Argument Is Foreclosed by 
This Court's Prior Decision of March 13, 2008. 
Even if there had, at some point, been some legal infirmity in Petitioner's pursuit 
of a private right of action for vindication of his rights as a career service employee, the 
time for Respondents to invoke that infirmity has long since passed. This Court 
expressly held, in its decision of March 13, 2008 (Petitioner's Opening Brief at 
Appendix, Attachment 9), that "[w]e conclude that the district court determined that 
5
 "Career service employee" is defined at Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-3(3) as "an 
employee who has successfully completed a probationary period of service in a position 
covered by the Career Service." 
982405.1 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Blauer's claims had been raised in such a way that there were no jurisdictional 
deficiencies at the agency or district court level. Thus, the district court's order of 
remand was an order to consider Blauer's claims on the merits. The DWS and the CSRB 
did not challenge the district court's conclusions regarding jurisdiction through an appeal 
to this court. As a result, district court's conclusions became the law of the case, and the 
CSRB was bound by the district court's legal conclusions and mandates." Respondents' 
current argument completely disregards, and stands in defiance of, this Court's mandate 
on remand from the prior appeal. 
C. Respondents' Remaining Jurisdictional Arguments Have Been Ruled Upon 
and Rejected by Three Separate Courts, Including This One. 
Pages 33-35 of Respondents' Answering Brief continues to parrot the arguments 
which it has been unsuccessfully making in this proceeding for years: that CSRB lacked 
jurisdiction to hear Petitioner's claim of violation of R. 477-15-1, et seq. Respondents 
defend their intransience before this Court, as they did in the previous administrative 
proceedings, by insisting that the language of this Court's prior ruling did not really mean 
what it said - that questions or jurisdiction were still fair game for argument and 
decision-making purposes for the Career Service review board. 
This Court could not possibly have been any clearer in its mandate on remand: 
We conclude that the district court determined that Blauer's claims had 
been raised in such a way that there were no jurisdictional deficiencies at 
the agency or district court level Thus, the district court's order of remand 
was an order to consider Blauer's claims on the merits." 
Memorandum Decision of March 13, 2008 (Petitioner's Opening Brief at Appendix, 
Attachment 9) at p. 2 (emphasis added). The message was crystal clear: Petitioner Lorin 
9 
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I 
Blauer was entitled to a determination of the merits of his claim of workplace 
discrimination and harassment under R. 477-15-1, et seq., and to appropriate relief. 
Respondents' continual evasion of the responsibility placed directly upon CSRB by this 
Court's prior ruling (as well as that of the Third District Court and the Utah Supreme 
Court) is incomprehensible under the circumstances. 
Respondents continue to argue that the repeated judicial rejections of its 
jurisdiction argument do not foreclose the hearing officer's disposition, claiming that the 
rulings of the Third District Court, the Utah Court of Appeals, and the Utah Supreme 
Court relate only to jurisdictional infirmities expressly addressed fry the Third District 
Court (see Answering Brief at pp. 35-36). This claim completely disregards the course of 
proceedings before those bodies, and the express language of this Court's last declaration 
on the matter. In Respondents' brief to this Court in the prior proceeding (R. 1831-1935 
at Exhibit 12, pp. 25-26), DWS made the exact same argument which Respondents make 
now. This Court rejected that argument, however, and ordered that Grievant's claims 
herein be remanded for determination by CSRB on their merits. Respondents' Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court from this Court's opinion (R. 1831-
1935 at Exhibit 13, pp. 13-14) made the same argument - that Petitioner's exclusive 
remedy for violation of workplace rules relating to discrimination was under Utah's Anti-
Discrimination Act. By denying certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court confirmed the 
mandate issued by the Court of Appeals. In short, CSRB has been directed by three 
separate courts of competent jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's discrimination claims on 
their merits. That mandate has now been disregarded three times. Petitioner is entitled to 
10 
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appropriate relief based on the hearing officer's finding of fact that he was the object of 
discrimination. 
Respondents continue to chant their mantra that "jurisdictional deficiencies may 
be raised at any point in proceedings" (Respondents' Answering Brief at p. 35). What 
they refuse to acknowledge is that claims of jurisdictional deficiency have been raised in 
this proceeding, and have been rejected by the courts. This is now law of the case. 
Respondents' cited case authority does not authorize or justify open rebellion against 
prior declarations of this court. 
As a final note, Petitioner would ask this Court to consider Respondent's 
strenuous opposition to Petitioner's Motion to Consolidate this case before the CSRB 
with his case currently pending in Third District Court. Petitioner had filed a 
discrimination claim with UALD in 2003, received a "notice of right to sue" and filed 
suit in Third District Court. That case is being held in abeyance pending the outcome of 
this case at CSRB. Knowing that CSRB disclaimed jurisdiction for discrimination and 
failure to accommodate claims, Petitioner moved to consolidate the two cases in order to 
save precious judicial resources and to have his case heard in a forum where jurisdiction 
would not be an issue. Respondents resisted, insisting that CSRB hear the matter. Now, 
once again, CSRB (at DWS' urging) has refused to make a decision on the merits of 
Petitioner's discrimination claim on the specious argument that it lacks jurisdiction; that 
only UALD has jurisdiction to hear the matter. 
11 
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Precious Court resources are wasted by this matter being continually remanded to 
the CSRB and repeatedly appealed to this Court, for remand once again to the CSRB, in a 
never-ending, time-wasting, resource-draining cycle. 
POINT II: THE HEARING OFFICER IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED 
PETITIONER'S REBUTTAL EVIDENCE CONCERNING 
WORKPLACE ACCOMMODATION OPTIONS OPEN TO 
DWS. 
In response to Petitioners' assignment of error to the hearing officer's refusal to 
admit rebuttal testimony that, in fact, DWS could have placed him in a position within 
DWS which would have accommodated his disabilities, Respondents claim that (1) the 
argument was not preserved at the administrative level, and is therefore beyond this 
Court's subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) the testimony would have been irrelevant and 
argumentative. Neither claim has merit. 
A. Petitioner's Assignment of Error Was Preserved at the Administrative Level. 
Concerning Respondents' first claim - that Petitioner's assignment of error 
concerning the exclusion of evidence was not preserved at the administrative level - the 
Court is referred to Petitioner's opening Level 6 brief before CSRB (R. 1616-1742) at pp. 
41-42. 
B. The Hearing Officer's Exclusion of Evidence Was Neither Irrelevant Nor 
Harmless Error. 
Concerning the relevance of Petitioner's offered testimony concerning potential 
positions within DWS which his disabilities would still let him perform, and the 
prejudicial nature of the hearing officer's error in excluding that evidence, the Court is 
referred to pages 24-29 of Petitioner's opening brief concerning DWS' supposed 
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justification of its discrimination against Petitioner based on his disability. Both 
Mr. Blauer's supervisor, Tani Downing, and executive director, Raylene Ireland, testified 
that the conducting of hearings full-time by Petitioner was the only way that they could 
"accommodate" his disability (TR. at 794-795). Petitioner - a 23-year employee with 
DWS - retook the stand prepared to testify that, in fact, DWS had other options available 
which could have accommodated his disability, in compliance with Utah Admin. Code 
R. 477-15-1, et seq. (2003). How Respondents can now take the position that the hearing 
officer's refusal to permit that testimony was somehow irrelevant or harmless error is 
incomprehensible. As Mr. Blauer's representative attempted to proffer, that testimony 
would have proven indisputably that reasonable accommodation was not only available, 
but easily accomplished (R. TR at 932). Petitioner's testimony would have proven, to 
any rational mind, that DWS' "accommodation" was, in fact, discrimination. 
POINT III: THE HEARING OFFICER IMPROPERLY FOUND THAT 
DWS HAD NOT VIOLATED UTAH ADMIN. CODE R. 477-
10-1, ETSEQ. BY FAILING TO DEFINE PROPER JOB 
PARAMETERS FOR PETITIONER. 
Respondents' Answering Brief seeks to defend CSRB's rejection of Petitioner's 
claim that DWS failed to follow governing administrative law in defining its job 
parameters by arguing (essentially) that DWS' belated issuance of a performance plan in 
June of 2003 constituted a nunc pro tunc remedy; and that this, coupled with prior 
informational and verbal interviews, was sufficient to overcome DWS' disregard of 
governing law. 
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Respondents' rationale (as well as that employed by CSRB and its hearing officer 
at the administrative level) was addressed at pages 44-46 of Petitioner's opening brief. 
Once again, the standard as established by administrative law in 2003 was emphatic in its 
requirement that, like all agencies of state government, DWS was required to formulate, 
publish and maintain performance plans for each employee, and that performance 
reviews and valuations be conducted according to the employee's meeting of objective, 
measureable standards of performance and conduct established by the performance plan -
see R 477-10-1 (2003). No cited evidence in the record - whether marshaled in 
Petitioner's opening brief or set out in Respondents' Answering Brief- dislodges the fact 
that this was not done in Petitioner's case; that he was subjected to an unsuccessful job 
rating, and put on corrective action, based on charges of deficient work performance 
which had either been corrected, or shown by Petitioner (and acknowledged by DWS) to 
be groundless; that Petitioner was nonetheless rated "unsuccessful" in 2003 based on 
claims that he was "not carrying [his] share of the workload" - an observation which, 
upon confrontation, his supervisor, Tani Downing, could not explain or quantify (TR. at 
288-289); that, by letter dated September 5, 2003, executive director, Raylene Ireland, 
openly admitted that DWS had not articulated required standards of performance against 
which Petitioner's job performance could be measured (Grievance Exhibit 39); but that, 
even after the "unsuccessful" rating was retracted, Petitioner was transferred to an 
assignment to conduct administrative hearings full-time, even though disabilities 
preventing him from performing in that position - all on the claim that he continued to 
meet unmeasurable and unarticulated performance standards (Grievance Exhibit 38). 
14 
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None of the justifications offered by Respondents, either at the administrative 
level or before this Court, change any of the foregoing. Petitioner's job description was 
intermittent and inadequate. By admission of his own superiors, neither his immediate 
supervisor nor the executive director of his department could even articulate objective, 
measurable standards against which his performance could be evaluated. Yet, because he 
supposedly failed to meet these unmeasurable and undisclosed expectations, Petitioner 
was reassigned to a position which he could not perform - a scenario which his treating 
physician characterized as "a blueprint to destroy the man" (TR. at 565-566). 
POINT IV: THE HEARING OFFICER ERRED IN RULING THAT, AS A 
MATTER OF LAW, TANI DOWNING'S SEPTEMBER 9, 
2003 "NOTICE OF REASSIGNMENT" WAS NOT A 
GRIEVABLE "WRITTEN REPRIMAND" UNDER 
GOVERNING LAW. 
In attempting to justify CSRB' s prehearing rej ection of Petitioner's challenge to 
written reprimands placed in his personnel file, Respondents have taken the singular step 
of completely rewriting the applicable statutory standard in order to fit their proposed 
argument. Citing to federal case law which actually interprets the elements of federal 
discrimination laws, Respondents argue that (1) Tani Downing9 s September 9, 2003 
notice of reassignment (Grievance Exhibit 38) did not result in a "demotion" (this point 
having been decided by a prior decision of this Court); (2) as a result, it did not constitute 
"adverse job action" (importing standards from federal case law interpreting federal 
discrimination statutes); and (3) it was therefore not a "written reprimand." Respondents' 
leaps of logic are unsustainable under even minimal scrutiny. 
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Once again, Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-a-202(l) (a) expressly afforded CSRB 
jurisdiction to hear appeals from career service employees and agencies of decisions 
relating to written reprimands. Neither the statute nor any interpretive case law limits ' 
CSRB's authority to written reprimands which result in "disciplinary action [that] effects 
a significant change in [the employees] employment status" (Respondent's Answering 
Brief at p. 40). By its language and terminology, clear intent and result, Tani Downing5s 
September 9th 2003 memorandum was in the nature of a reprimand; served as a 
reprimand and as a basis for remedial or corrective action by intent if not technical 
definition and was the grounds for the employment action which fundamentally altered 
Petitioner's job assignment beyond his ability to perform. 
Moreover, Petitioner's grievance of his supervisor's written reprimand was clearly 
not barred by the doctrine of "res judicata " - to the contrary, it was expressly preserved 
by orders of the Third District and this Court in prior stages of this proceeding. By Order 
dated August 16, 2004, the Third District Court remanded Petitioner's grievance of his 
written reprimands to CSRB for determination (R. 1676-1685, Petitioner's opening brief 
at Appendix, Attachments 6 and 7); by its ruling of March 13, 2008, this Court 
overturned CSRB's rejection of that claim and ordered it heard on its merits (R. 1699-
1702, Petitioner's opening brief at Appendix, Attachment 9). The doctrine of "issue 
preclusion" (the branch ofres judicata invoked by Respondents - see Respondents' 
Answering Brief at p. 41) relates only to discreet and specific issues actually litigated and 
finally determined in a prior proceeding. The question of whether Tani Downing's 
September 9, 2003 reassignment memorandum was or was not a "written reprimand" has 
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not been decided in any prior case; indeed, it has been preserved through all stages of the 
instant proceeding. Accordingly, the doctrine has no application. See Oman v. Davis 
School District, 2008 Utah 70, f 28, 194 P.3d 956; Youren v. Tintic School District, 2004 
UT App.33, 86 P.3d 771. This Court's prior pronouncement that the memorandum did 
not constitute a "demotion" cannot be equated to a prior determination, in another and 
concluded proceeding, that it did not constitute a "written reprimand" - particularly when 
this Court's own prior pronouncements have expressly remanded that question to CSRB 
for determination. 
Respondents likewise mount a "public policy" argument as justification for the 
observations in Tani Downing's September 9, 2003 memorandum, relying on the 1981 
New York decision of Holt v. Board of Education ofWeeutuck Central School District, 
52 N.Y.2d 625, 422 N.E.2d 499 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1981). The Holt decision, however, dealt 
with a memorandum placed in teachers' personnel files for the purpose of calling their 
attention to "a relatively minor breach of school policy" in order to "encourage 
compliance with that policy in the future" - 15 N.Y.2d at 634. Ms. Downing's 
September 9, 2003 memorandum (Grievance Exhibit 38), by contrast, leveled charges of 
serious ethical violations and job misconduct at Petitioner, offered as justification for 
revoking his traditional duties as Legal/Enforcement Counsel III, and confining him to 
the duties of a full-time administrative law judge - a position which he was precluded by 
disability from fulfilling. The Holt decision observed that the memorandum questioned 
were intended as encouragement, not castigation - "the purpose is to warn, and hopefully 
to instruct - not to punish" (Id.). It is hard to imagine a more punitive act which Tani 
QSnAHS 1 
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Downing could have leveled at Petitioner than reassigning him to work which existing 
disability precluded him from performing.6 Incident to her memo, Downing knowingly 
forced him to perform tasks which she knew or should have known, because of the direct 
and consistent directions and warnings of his doctor, would cause him lancinating and 
distracting pain (Grievant Exhs. 22-25), causing him to fail at those assigned tasks and 
forcing him ultimately to fail at his job. Worse still, Tani Downing's September 9, 2003 
memorandum threw into Petitioner's face charges of serious job performance deficiencies 
which had been previously considered, and either remedied or shown to be groundless; in 
several instances, they have been retracted by Tani Downing herself. Yet they resurfaced 
as justification for reassigning him to sedentary job duties expressly precluded by his 
health care provider, without a scrap of medical evidence to controvert the fact that he 
could not perform in that position. At the very least, the hearing officer should have put 
DWS to the burden of proving that the contents of the reprimand were valid - Utah Code 
Ann. § 67-19a-406(2) (a) (2003). 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents' Answering Brief, simply put, is a collection of arguments, both old 
and new, which have been either expressly rejected or foreclosed by prior rulings of this 
Court. The Utah State Career Service Review Board refused to afford Petitioner the 
6
 In the case of Gutman v. Board of Education of City School District of the City of 
New York, 18 Misc. 3d 609, 852 N.Y. Supp. 2d 658 (S. Ct N.Y. Cnty, N.Y. 2007), New 
York's Supreme Court distinguished the Holt decision, observing that the written 
reprimands in that case "chastised petitioner for serious misconduct," and did not 
"encourage [petitioners] to improve their performance or . . . to instruct them as to future 
matters" (18 Misc. 3d at 615). As such, the notices in the Gutman decision were held to 
be grievable written reprimands. 
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procedure and remedy which, by express ruling of this Court, he was entitled to receive. 
On that basis, the Step Six ruling of the Career Service Review Board should be reversed, 
and Petitioner compensated with back pay and benefits, retroactive to September 9, 2003. 
As an alternative, and to the extent permitted by governing law, this matter should be 
remanded for joint consideration with Petitioner's pending action in Third District Court, 
it having become clear that CSRB is unwilling to honor this Court's directives on 
remand. 
DATED this 8th day of July, 2011. 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC 
j-^_^£^_ y~ 
^Vincent C. Rampton 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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